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At a time when Turkey’s relations with the European Union 
have been frayed and official channels of communication 
are neither stable nor effective, civil society offers an 
important avenue of interaction. This paper looks at 
whether and how civil society organizations can influence 
public opinion in Turkey and across the European Union 
for closer cooperation. Accordingly, it first examines how 
civil society actors mobilized around Turkey’s European 
Union membership bid in the early years of Turkey’s 
candidacy. The paper explores the earlier efforts of 
prominent civic actors, and discusses the enabling factors. 
After a brief overview of the changing conditions, the 
paper then suggests different ways in which civil society 
can influence public opinion in Turkey and across the 
European Union today. In so doing, the paper considers 
the challenges that lie ahead.
Introduction
Lively relations during the initial years of Turkey’s 
European Union candidacy soon gave way to a period of 
stagnation. The reform process and the membership talks 
first lost pace, then came to a halt. This has been followed 
in recent years by a turbulent period marked by rapid ups 
and downs.
EU–Turkey relations were shaken with the EU’s strong 
condemnation of excessive police force against 
demonstrators during the Gezi protests in 2013. The 
launching of visa liberalization dialogue later that year, 
Turkey’s declaration of 2014 as the “Year of Europe” and 
the announcement of the New EU Strategy had little 
impact on reinvigorating the relations. In response to 
the migration crisis, Turkey and the EU signed a Joint 
Action Plan in late 2015 that identified a series of actions. 
Most notably, the EU pledged to mobilize new funds 
to Turkey outside the pre-accession assistance, and in 
return Turkey would step up its patrolling activity and 
implement policies to facilitate Syrian refugees’ access 
to public services. This collaboration was deepened 
with the EU–Turkey Statement of March 2016 that 
included an arrangement whereby Turkey agreed to 
take back new irregular immigrants whose application 
is found inadmissible.1 The rapprochement following the 
migration crisis was short-lived. Turkish officials criticized 
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the EU for its rather slow reaction to the events unfolding 
on the night of the putsch in July 2016, while the EU 
leaders were alarmed by the purges that took place in the 
aftermath of the failed coup attempt. Since 2016, tensions 
have once again been building between Turkey and the 
EU, as manifested in reactions by EU leaders to the purges, 
concern over EU citizens behind bars in Turkey, and 
diplomatic rows in several EU countries during electoral 
and referendum campaigns. In particular, the German and 
Dutch ban on political rallies held by Turkish government 
officials to address the Turkish diaspora, and Erdoğan’s 
Nazi comparisons to Germany and the Netherlands that 
followed suit, have served to heighten tensions. While 
calls made in the European Parliament and in several EU 
capitals to freeze and even end the accession process are 
left unanswered, relations have clearly deteriorated over 
the past five years.
How to break the current deadlock in Turkey–EU 
relations and achieve closer cooperation is a challenge 
confronting politicians, bureaucrats and scholars alike. 
Different platforms for high-level dialogue2 provide a 
communication channel for politicians. Important as 
they are, however, these channels and their sustainability 
are vulnerable to sudden changes in the political 
environment.
What may be encouraging here is the resilient public 
support in Turkey for EU membership. Different surveys 
reveal this general trend of public support despite the 
ups and downs in politics. A good part of this support 
is a result of the Turkish public’s continued perception of 
the EU as an anchor for Turkey’s struggling economy and 
faltering democracy. The issue is how to take on board 
this public support in a constructive way.
EU integration is not only a result of the deliberate actions 
of policy-makers to adjust rules. Scholars have long 
acknowledged the importance of a parallel development 
of linkages between different social actors that combine 
previously unconnected actors – what some have termed 
as “informal integration”.3 Informal integration results from 
“intense patterns of interaction” following the dynamics of 
markets, communication networks and social exchange 
rather than the intervention of governmental decisions. 
Non-state actors, including civil society organizations, are 
important agents in informal integration.
Turkish civil society has come to the forefront during the 
early years of Turkey’s EU candidacy. Various civil society 
organizations across different ethnic, religious, social and 
political lines emerged as Euro-enthusiasts and actively 
2 For instance Association Council meetings and High-Level 
Political Dialogues meetings established by the 2016 EU–Turkey 
Statement.
3 William Wallace, The Transformation of Western Europe, London, 
Pinter and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990, p. 54.
supported Turkey’s EU membership bid.4 Their support, in 
return, has been instrumental in gaining and sustaining 
the momentum of the accession process in the 2000s. 
Today, at a time when official channels of communication 
are neither stable nor effective, it is timely to revisit the 
potential role of civil society in Turkey’s relations with 
the EU. Despite deteriorating relations, civil society 
continues to offer an important channel for interaction. In 
addition, the EU’s civil society support in Turkey not only 
continues but is expanding, while both sides have kept 
this dimension apart from daily political conflicts. Given 
this framework, what, if any, role civil society can play to 
move forward from this conundrum, and whether and 
how it can influence public opinion in favour of closer 
cooperation are relevant questions.
1. Turkish Civil Society and Support for the 
EU Accession Process
During the years immediately after the announcement 
of Turkey’s EU candidacy, several civil society groups took 
action in support of Turkey’s EU membership aspiration. 
Their efforts were multi-pronged. Several civil society 
groups focused on EU-related issues, mobilized their 
members and the public at large, and lobbied at home 
and abroad. Some acted on their own, while many more 
acted as part of established broad-based coalitions. Some 
other organizations acted in collaboration with their 
counterparts in EU countries.
For instance, the Turkish Industry and Business Association 
(TÜSİAD) devoted substantial energy to mobilizing 
support for Turkey’s EU membership bid during this 
period. TÜSİAD established an EU Harmonization 
Committee as well as commissions and working groups 
to follow the harmonization work carried out vis-à-
vis negotiation chapters.5 It organized meetings with 
academicians, bureaucrats and business people to 
discuss the reform process. It also led publicity campaigns 
to inform public opinion. In 1997, even before the EU’s 
announcement of Turkey’s candidacy, TÜSİAD published 
a report on Turkey’s democratization, which touched 
upon a number of sensitive political issues and put 
forward concrete proposals for reform. Through seminars, 
it fostered public debates on issues raised in this report. 
The report also generated controversy, and came under 
4 Ayhan Kaya and Raffaele Marchetti, “Europeanization, Framing 
Competition and Civil Society in the EU and Turkey”, in Global Turkey 
in Europe Working Papers, No. 6 (February 2014), p. 7, https://www.
iai.it/en/node/1594.
5 Hakan Altinay, “Does Civil Society Matter?”, in Michael Lake (ed.), 
The EU & Turkey. A Glittering Prize Or a Millstone?, London, The Federal 
Trust, 2005, p. 109; Serap Atan, “Europeanisation of Turkey Peak 
Business Organisations and Turkey-EU Relations”, in Mehmet Uğur 
and Nergis Canefe (eds), Turkey and European Integration. Accession 
Prospects and Issues, London and New York, Routledge, 2004, p. 
107. See also TÜSİAD annual reports during this period, available in 
Turkish at https://tusiad.org/en/tuesiad-annual-reports.
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major criticism from the military and state elites as well 
as some of TÜSİAD’s own members.6 TÜSİAD also lobbied 
lawmakers to accelerate the reform process, and even 
opened a permanent representative office in Ankara to 
facilitate its efforts in this direction.
In addition, TÜSİAD lobbied for support in the EU and 
across European capitals. It organized meetings at 
the European Parliament, European Commission and 
permanent delegations in Brussels. In the run-up to the 
Copenhagen Summit, TÜSİAD placed an advertisement 
in the leading newspapers in EU member states to start 
Turkey’s accession negotiations without delay. TÜSİAD 
actively participated in the workings of the Union of 
Industrial and Employers’ Confederation in Europe 
(UNICE), now known as BusinessEurope, and conveyed its 
messages to representatives of businesses across Europe.
The Economic Development Foundation (İktisadi 
Kalkınma Vakfı, İKV)7 was equally active during this period. 
In Turkey, İKV addressed both the business sector and the 
public at large. In the early 2000s, İKV held seminars on 
Turkey’s EU accession process in several provinces to raise 
awareness on this topic. In this, it enjoyed the support 
of public institutions, local governments, universities 
and civil society organizations. Soon after the accession 
negotiations started, İKV gave training courses on 
Regulatory Impact Assessment and carried out a project 
on the effects of horizontal implementation of the EU’s 
acquis on the leading Turkish sectors. İKV performed 
several activities at the EU level as well. It organized 
a series of seminars for experts at the EU institutions 
working on Turkey to give a better overview of Turkey’s 
political, economic and cultural structure. It also brought 
members of the European Parliament and representatives 
of Turkish civil society together to create a discussion 
platform to better understand one another.8
During this period there were also several major 
collaborative efforts. One of the most prominent examples 
of this is the Turkey Platform. Following the invitation 
of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges 
of Turkey (TOBB), over 250 civil society organizations 
came together to establish the Turkey Platform in 2002. 
Under the İKV’s coordination, the Platform carried out 
intense communication and lobbying activities, both 
6 Ziya Öniş, “Entrepreneurs, Citizenship and the European Union: 
The Changing Nature of State-Business Relations in Turkey”, in E. 
Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu (eds), Citizenship in a Global World. 
European Questions and Turkish Experiences, London and New York, 
Routledge, 2005, p. 183.
7 The Economic Development Foundation was established in 1965 
with the initiative of Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Istanbul 
Chamber of Industry to inform Turkish business and the Turkish 
public on European integration and Turkey–EU relations.
8 See Economic Development Foundation website: Projects: 
European Parliamentarians and Turkish Civil Society Dialogue 
Meetings, https://oldweb.ikv.org.tr/icerik_en.asp?konu=projeler&b
aslik=PROJECTS
in Turkey and in the EU.9 For instance, in the run-up to 
the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002, 
the Platform adopted a declaration called “Türkiye’nin yeri 
Avrupa Birliği’dir. Kaybedecek zamanımız yoktur” [Turkey’s 
place is in the European Union, there is no time to waste].10
Finally, the activities of various other actors boosted 
the pro-EU campaigns. For instance, broad-based civic 
initiatives were active during the early years of Turkey’s 
candidacy. A well-known example of this is the European 
Movement 2002. This initiative rallied support for the 
adoption of political reforms and Turkey’s accession 
into the EU. The Movement lobbied lawmakers and 
organized publicity campaigns. It is best-known for its 
publicity campaign in 2006 in support of political reforms 
in Turkey with the slogan “Başka yarın yok” [There is no 
other tomorrow]. The Movement attracted well-known 
figures from academia, media, business and the arts, 
such as İshak Alaton (businessman), Mustafa Altıoklar 
(director), Murathan Mungan (poet/author) and Arzum 
Onan (actress), and enjoyed wide media coverage for 
its campaigns and activities. In addition, the Movement 
was active in several EU capitals including Brussels.11 
Universities, also, were active during this period. They 
organized informative seminars on EU affairs, and opened 
research centres with a focus on the EU.
Civil society groups moved to the forefront and gained 
visibility as Turkey’s accession gained momentum in 
the early 2000s. Even then, however, they were not a 
genuinely strong actor. These groups could make an 
impact because they made good use of the conjunctural 
opportunities. Firstly, in general terms, there was a 
positive atmosphere within the EU regarding Turkey’s 
accession process, which overshadowed the critical 
voices. Secondly, during this period, the AKP government 
prioritized Turkey’s relations with the EU and devoted 
substantial energy in that direction. The AKP enjoyed 
widespread public support in this, as EU accession had 
become a goal of different sectors of society in Turkey. 
In addition, the AKP government was open to the 
contributions and participation of civil society. There 
were structured and coordinated dialogue mechanisms. 
For instance, the EU Communication Group was a joint 
initiative bringing together the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Secretariat General for the EU Affairs and the 
Directorate General of Press and Information on the one 
hand, and TOBB, TÜSİAD and İKV on the other. These 
groups worked together to identify prejudices against 
9 Economic Development Foundation, 50 Years. Turkey’s EU 
Expert, April 2015, https://www.ikv.org.tr/images/files/IKV50_
yilBrosurENG.pdf.
10 Kemal Kirişci and Zeynep Gülşah Çapan, “Turkey on the Edges of 
the Convention on the ‘Future of Europe’”, in South European Society 
and Politics, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 2004), p. 184.
11 “Avrupa Hareketi 2002: ABye Katılalım” [European Movement 
2002: Join the EU], in Bianet, 10 May 2002, https://bianet.org/
bianet/siyaset/9871-avrupa-hareketi-2002-abye-katilalim.
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Turkey in the EU public and inform relevant sectors on 
Turkey’s recent efforts towards EU accession. In this way, 
Turkey’s accession process captured momentum.
The work of the civil society groups was built on this existing 
momentum. In a way, these groups were sailing with the 
wind, not against it. What the civic actors achieved was to 
employ the right strategies to strengthen and maintain 
this momentum. They carried out intense and consistent 
communication, promotion and lobbying activities. In 
doing so they made successful use of their networks, 
and established strong partnerships and broad-based 
coalitions. Some campaigns enlisted individuals across 
the media, business, academia, the arts and culture, who 
helped disseminate and even popularize their messages 
and activities. Media support was particularly important 
as these campaigns and declarations have frequently 
found a place in the press, sometimes even free of 
charge.12 In addition, the dialogue channels with state 
structures allowed campaigners to have regular dialogue 
with government officials, which enabled them to both 
follow and influence policy-making.
Finally, all this was coupled with an improving institutional 
and legal environment for Turkish civil society, thanks to 
the EU accession process.13 This positive atmosphere 
not only encouraged the establishment and activities 
of civil society organizations, it also led many groups to 
champion the accession process.
However, not long after, the favourable conditions of the 
early 2000s changed. Firstly, Turkey’s EU accession process 
had lost steam both in Turkey and in the EU as early as 
the late 2000s. There were several reasons for this, some 
of them interrelated. On the one hand, enlargement 
fatigue, the financial crisis and the rise of right-wing 
political parties created an enlargement aversion across 
the EU. This has not boded well for Turkey’s membership 
prospects, already contested on not only economic and 
political grounds, but also cultural and societal ones.14 In 
addition, the shy scepticism of some EU leaders towards 
Turkey’s accession during the early years of its candidacy 
was now expressed more loudly. On the other hand, with 
other items in the Turkish government’s foreign policy 
agenda, the EU accession bid lost its priority. With that, 
EU-related issues dropped off the Turkish media radar as 
well. All this has resulted in a de-Europeanization process 
whereby the EU has ceased to provide a normative and 
political context affecting politics, policy and public 
debates in Turkey.15
12 Hakan Altinay, “Does Civil Society Matter?”, cit., p. 111.
13 Özge Zihnioğlu, European Union Civil Society Policy and Turkey. 
A Bridge Too Far?, Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013, p. 140-154.
14 Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Constructions of European Identity. Debates 
and Discourses on Turkey and the EU, Basingstoke and New York, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
15 Senem Aydın-Düzgit and Alper Kaliber, “Encounters with 
Secondly, the mood of optimism surrounding civic 
groups has given way with the changing landscape of 
civil society in Turkey. The fast-paced reform process 
of the early 2000s had slowed by mid-decade. This left 
several issues pertaining to civil society half-finished 
or untouched, giving rise to problems, particularly in 
implementation.
Less than a decade later, the government’s conciliatory 
approach had disappeared. In 2013, the ban on 
International Workers’ Day celebrations in Taksim 
Square was reinstated. After three years of peaceful 
demonstrations, the government denied access to the 
square on account of construction work being carried 
out. While some civil society groups and civic activists 
continued to organize campaigns and protests,16 these 
often faced excessive force by riot police to disperse 
the protestors. The Gezi protests in the summer of 2013 
are considered not only a culminating point due to their 
scale, but also a turning point, as the legal and political 
environment for civil society deteriorated soon after the 
protests.
In the meantime, the legal environment for civic 
engagement also deteriorated. In March 2015, in response 
to widespread protests against the government’s 
decision not to intervene in ISIS’s Kobane siege, the 
Turkish parliament passed a set of restrictive laws. The 
new laws considerably strengthened the powers of the 
police during demonstrations, extending police authority 
to the detriment of rights and freedoms.
The failed coup attempt in July 2016 became yet another 
turning point for Turkish civil society. Only days after 
the coup attempt, a state of emergency was imposed 
to investigate those responsible in a more efficient 
way. However, many people are of the opinion that the 
crackdown has become a tool to silence any opposing 
view.17 A large number of arrests, closure of civil society 
organizations and restrictions on public gatherings 
significantly narrowed civic space. What is politically 
permissible in terms of civil society activities has changed, 
putting new pressure on activists and civil society 
groups. A presidential decree in July 2018 expanded 
the President’s authority over civil society organizations 
through the State Supervisory Board.18 The decree 
Europe in an Era of Domestic and International Turmoil: Is Turkey a 
De-Europeanising Candidate Country?”, in South European Society 
and Politics, Vol. 21, No. 1, (2016), p. 1-14, https://doi.org/10.1080/1
3608746.2016.1155282.
16 Özge Zihnioğlu, “The Prospects of Civic Alliance: New Civic 
Activists Acting Together with Civil Society Organizations”, in 
Voluntas, published online 10 September 2018, DOI 10.1007/
s11266-018-0032-9.
17 AP, “Turkey Detains Editor and Staff at Opposition Cumhuriyet 
Newspaper”, in The Guardian, 31 October 2016, https://gu.com/
p/5a65m.
18 Turkey’s Presidential Decree No. 5 of 15 July 2018 on a State 
Supervisory Board, Official Gazette No. 30479 of 15 July 2018, 
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empowers the Board with the authority to conduct 
administrative investigations and issue dismissals as a 
precautionary measure. A growing sense of uncertainty 
and fear has become the defining characteristic of Turkish 
civil society, especially since the coup attempt.19 In turn, 
this has led many groups to shy away from carrying out 
activities and holding publicity campaigns on politically 
sensitive issues.
2. Turkish Civil Society and Influencing 
Public Opinion
The recent developments have considerably narrowed 
Turkish civil society’s range of action and impact. Under 
the current circumstances, then, how could Turkish civil 
society organizations influence public opinion in Turkey 
and across the EU in favour of closer cooperation?
2.1 Public Opinion in Turkey
Identifying which strategies Turkish civil society 
organizations should adopt and what issues they should 
focus on requires first a careful look at Turkish public 
opinion on Turkey–EU relations. Despite varying figures 
and recent fluctuations, different surveys point to 
continuing public support in Turkey for EU membership.20 
This is important considering that the relations have had 
to endure a series of crises and that the accession process 
is de facto on hold. That said, there is persistent disbelief 
in Turkish society that Turkey will ever manage to become 
a member of the EU.21
Turkish civil society, on its own, cannot revitalize the 
relations between Turkey and the EU. However, it can 
focus on issues that could take on board societal support 
in a constructive way. The findings of the İKV’s 2017 survey 
on Perception of Europe and Support for EU Membership 
in Turkish Public Opinion are telling in this respect. Over 
38 per cent of respondents said that at least one of the 
reasons why they support Turkey’s EU membership 
process is to benefit from “free movement, the right of 
settlement and educational opportunities”.22 This shows 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/07/20180715-2.pdf.
19 E. Fuat Keyman, Nathalie Tocci and Michael Werz (eds), Trends in 
Turkish Civil Society, Washington, Center for American Progress, July 
2017, p. 15, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/
reports/2017/07/10/435475.
20 See for instance the regular surveys of Eurobarometer 
(http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion), Kadir Has 
University’s surveys on Social and Political Trends in Turkey (http://
ctrs.khas.edu.tr/25/turkiye-siyasal-sosyal-egilimler-anketleri), 
and Economic Development Foundation’s surveys on Perception 
of Europe and Support for EU Membership in Turkish Public Opinion 
(https://www.ikv.org.tr/ikv.asp?ust_id=70&id=207).
21 See surveys on Social and Political Trends in Turkey carried out 
by Kadir Has Center for Turkish Studies, http://ctrs.khas.edu.tr/25/
turkiye-siyasal-sosyal-egilimler-anketleri.
22 Economic Development Foundation, Türkiye Kamuoyunda AB 
just how important the Turkish public considers mobility 
to and within the EU. Accordingly, the achievement of 
visa liberalization is one issue that could have a significant 
impact on Turkish public opinion. The visa liberalization 
process is important not only because of the value 
Turkish people attach to mobility. It is often considered an 
expected step for an accession country, since all accession 
countries, except for Turkey, enjoy visa-free travel to 
Schengen countries. The delay in officially launching the 
visa liberalization process,23 and its slow progress with still 
no end in sight, likely dampens public perception of the 
EU and the accession process. Its successful completion 
could bring new momentum to the accession process, 
not least by stimulating public enthusiasm.
In addition, civil society organizations in Turkey can help 
keep a certain engagement with key European debates, 
such as Brexit and European Parliament elections. This will 
help Turkish society stay connected and informed on EU 
affairs. Considering that news outlets are restricted, civil 
society organizations can have a stronger social media 
presence.
All that said, we should be cautious with our expectations 
from civil society. It is true that during the early 2000s 
civil society organizations became increasingly vocal 
in support of the democratic reform process. However, 
much of this pressure was confined to major interest 
groups. The extent of these organizations’ power and 
influence in particular over the media was crucial in 
making their voices heard. Today, Turkish civil society 
remains weak and divided, except for a limited group of 
actors who find it increasingly difficult to undertake their 
work under the current circumstances. The effectiveness 
of EU aid in civil society empowerment has been limited 
and ambivalent,24 while for some civil society groups, 
the EU has lost its attractiveness as a reference point for 
their work.25 Considering the high polarization in Turkey, 
it is a challenge to bring together civil society groups 
representing various interests and different segments of 
Turkish society. In addition, influencing public opinion 
requires civil society actors that can better penetrate 
society. Therefore, the task at hand should also be 
focusing on the organic growth of Turkish civil society. If 
we direct too much attention towards the instrumental 
role of civil society, we might risk submerging that very 
Desteği ve Avrupa Algısı 2017 [Perception of Europe and Support 
for EU Membership in Turkish Public Opinion 2017], January 2018, 
https://www.ikv.org.tr/ikv.asp?ust_id=207&id=3115.
23 The visa liberalization process for Turkey was officially launched 
in late 2013, several years after membership talks started.
24 Özge Zihnioğlu, “European Union Civil Society Support 
and the Depoliticisation of Turkish Civil Society”, in Third 
World Quarterly, published online 24 December 2018, DOI 
10.1080/01436597.2018.1545567.
25 Büke Boşnak, “Europeanisation and De-Europeanisation 
Dynamics in Turkey: The Case of Environmental Organisations”, in 
South European Society and Politics, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2016), p. 75-90.
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role from view.
2.2 Public Opinion in the EU
Despite all negative developments and the current 
unfavourable environment, neither Turkey nor the EU is 
willing to end the membership talks.26 On the contrary, 
both sides are willing to engage further in a number 
of areas of joint interest, including migration, visa 
facilitation, trade, energy and counter-terrorism. In these 
areas, cooperation and progress are possible, feasible 
and at times necessary.
The willingness to cooperate and the possibility for 
progress in certain areas can be seen as a window of 
opportunity for Turkish civil society to influence public 
opinion across the EU. In these areas, civil society 
organizations can help step up cooperation. For instance, 
on the modernization of the customs union, TÜSİAD 
and the Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations 
(Türkiye İşveren Sendikalari Konfederasyonu, TISK) have 
been lobbying EU institutions and politicians, at times 
with their European counterparts at BusinessEurope. 
Other civil society organizations, particularly interest 
groups, can follow suit with their European counterparts.
There is also potential scope for engagement on certain 
policy issues that pertain to common challenges. One 
such area is migration. There is already a wide range of 
collaborative activities and partnerships on migration 
among civic organizations in Turkey and Greece. These 
organizations engage with different stakeholders in 
both countries to exchange information and experience, 
and raise awareness regarding migrants and their rights. 
The civic organizations in EU countries could frame the 
benefits of their cooperation with Turkish organizations 
as finding common solutions to EU-wide problems. In 
addition, these partnerships could be extended to other 
EU countries that host immigrants.
While there is a strong reaction in the EU to Turkey’s 
democratic backsliding, there are still civil society groups 
that support closer cooperation with Turkey. Turkish 
civil society organizations could reach out to EU citizens 
together with these organizations. Some of the civil 
society organizations and EU veterans in Turkey already 
have established relations. But such efforts should not be 
limited to the “usual suspects”, to achieve more extensive 
influence over the EU public opinion. This is easier said 
than done. The EU’s Dialogue Programmes have been 
important in starting new dialogues and establishing 
relations between several like-minded civil society 
organizations in Turkey and the EU. However, research 
shows that these relations do not sustain for long and 
26 While there are calls in the EU to suspend and even end the 
accession talks, for now their impact seems to be negligible.
tend to break off soon after the projects are completed.27
Focusing only on existing or potential areas of cooperation 
bears the risk of shifting the framework of relations 
from the accession process to a transactional one. In a 
transactional relation, Turkey and the EU can have close 
cooperation and achieve their aimed goals in given areas. 
However, a transactional relationship, practical as it may 
be, is still undesirable because such a relationship is not 
based on conditionality and lacks the normative pillar 
that the accession process has. What is desirable is to 
carry Turkey–EU relations forward within the framework 
of the accession process based on conditionality. After all, 
Turkey has been pursuing EU membership not only for 
economic gains and free movement but also to enhance 
its political and legal system and achieve an advanced 
level of democracy and fundamental rights regime.28 An 
active accession process based on conditionality makes 
this possible. In addition, transactional relations cannot 
reignite the accession process. Both the 2016 Positive 
EU–Turkey Agenda29 and the various high-level dialogue 
meetings on areas of joint interest have failed to revitalize 
Turkey’s accession process. Therefore all civil society work 
within Turkey and in the EU should encourage closer 
cooperation not as transactional ties but as part of the 
accession process.
Conclusion
In the early 2000s, several pro-EU civil society organizations 
in Turkey both reflected and built their efforts on the 
positive mood, political will and widespread support for EU 
membership in Turkey. They established strong coalitions 
with different stakeholders and carried out persistent 
publicity campaigns both inside Turkey and across EU 
capitals. This helped them to accelerate the momentum 
for accession negotiations. Over the years, not only has 
Turkey’s accession process lost its momentum, shrinking 
civic space in Turkey has limited the scope of civil society 
activity.
Today, while Turkish civil society on its own cannot put 
Turkey’s accession process back on track, it may still 
influence public opinion. On the one hand, civil society 
groups could make use of public support among Turks 
for their country’s EU membership. On the other hand, to 
influence public opinion across the EU, they could reach 
out and collaborate with their counterparts in the EU 
27 Özge Zihnioğlu, European Union Civil Society Policy and Turkey. A 
Bridge Too Far?, cit., p. 124.
28 Çiğdem Nas et al., IKV Report on Turkey-EU Relations: Keeping 
Together in the Face of Challenges, Istanbul, Economic Development 
Foundation, June 2017, p. 16, https://www.ikv.org.tr/ikv.
asp?id=1922.
29 European Commission, Positive EU-Turkey Agenda Launched in 
Ankara, 17 May 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
12-359_en.htm.
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countries on issues of common interest or pertaining to 
common challenges. That said, we should be wary of an 
overly instrumental approach to civil society, and should 
also focus attention on its growth and on enhancing the 
resilience of Turkey at the societal level. Ultimately, to 
mobilize public opinion, we need a strong, independent 
and vibrant civil society. Mobilizing public opinion is an 
uphill battle, but one with the potential for success and 
a worthwhile payoff.
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